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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
During a social interaction in a economic context or even in a basic everyday life situation, 
people do act differently depending if the interaction is likely to happen again in the future, 
depending on the frequency of this interaction, depending on the utility that people derive 
from this interaction. The choice they make during these social interactions determines the 
outcome (both real and expected) of it and these outcomes can be more or less stable in time. 
If they stabilize in time, game theorist will call it “equilibrium”, the condition of a system in 
which all competing influences are balanced. For every kind of interaction, there might be one 
or more possible equilibrium, depending also on the type of equilibrium that we are talking 
about.  
Among the theoretical possible kinds of equilibrium, we can find – among others- the 
following ones: 
- The Pareto efficient equilibrium. In a Pareto efficient economic equilibrium, no 
allocation of a given good can be made without making at least on individual worse 
off. It is a minimal notion of efficiency and does not necessarily result in a socially 
desirable distribution of resources (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983). 
- The Nash equilibrium. Proposed by the Nobel Price John Forbes Nash (1951), it 
represents a solution concept of game involving two or more players “in which each 
player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, “in which 
each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no 
player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally” (Osborne, 
Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein, 1994). If each player has chosen a strategy and no 
player can benefit by changing his strategy while the other players keep theirs 
unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs 
constitute a Nash equilibrium (a pure-strategy one). Most of the time, the expression 
Nash equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, meaning that it provides a 
complete definition of how player will play a game. It allows determining the kind of 
choice a player will make for any situation he could face. 
- The risk-dominant equilibrium (refinement of the Nash equilibrium). A Nash 
equilibrium is considered risk dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction, 
meaning the more uncertainty players have about the actions of the other player(s), the 
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more likely they will choose the strategy corresponding to it. In other words, it is a 
risk-avoidance equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). 
- The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). A 
mixed-strategy is an assignment of probability to each pure strategy. This allows for a 
player to randomly select a pure strategy. Pure-strategy (mentioned above) is a 
degenerate case of mixed strategy, in which that particular pure strategy is selected 
with probability 1 or 0. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a combination of players 
probability mix of strategy which gives the best possible repartition of decision sets 
for every single player given the possible repartition of decision set of the other 
players in the game. 
 
Experimental game theory does a good job at predicting, explaining and modelling these 
kinds of equilibriums in social or strategic interactions. But how do these equilibrium emerge 
in games? If they actually do, how do people converge to these equilibriums in real-life social 
interactions? Do people learn? What are their learning strategies? How do they use them to 
maximize their utility?  
 
“The question of how an equilibrium arises in a game has been largely avoided in the history 
of game theory, until recently. Equilibrium concepts implicitly assume that players either 
figure out what equilibrium to play by reasoning, follow the recommendation of a fictional 
outside arbiter (if that recommendation is self-enforcing), or learn or evolve toward the 
equilibrium.” This is how Camerer (1995) starts the chapter on Learning in his book 
(Behavioural Game theory Experiments in Strategic Interaction). When Camerer talks about 
equilibrium, he actually means a Nash equilibrium. But again, how do subjects figure out 
their equilibrium? And again, do they learn with the interaction? 
 
In his book, Camerer defines Learning as “an observed change in behaviour owing to 
experience.” Following Camerer’s statement, traditionally, Game theory has been focusing 
mainly on equilibrium analysis in iterated games, especially Nash equilibrium. If we ask 
ourselves when and why we might expect equilibrium of this kind to arise, the traditional 
explanation of equilibrium is that it emerges from a complete and serial analysis and 
introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the 
players, and the player’s earning functions are all common knowledge. But this answer may 
have both conceptually and empirically many problems.  
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First, there might be a problem in situations where there are multiple equilibriums. What 
makes the subjects a given equilibrium over another? How is this choice different from 
random? Stated differently, what mechanisms underlie the subjects choice of the same 
equilibrium? How does a specific procedure of coordination of players’ expectations 
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1981) come to be common knowledge?  
Second, there is still doubt that the hypothesis of exact common knowledge of payoffs and 
rationality apply to many games. If we do reduce the assumption of “common knowledge” to 
“almost common knowledge”, we might weaken the conclusions of what we predict, analyze 
or model through our experimental or theoretical setups.  
Third, equilibrium theory predicts poorly early rounds results of most experiments, even if it 
does better in later rounds. For example, it takes a while for subjects to realize in a simple 
public good game that the Nash equilibrium (their utility maximization strategy) is to 
contribute nothing. This move from non-equilibrium to equilibrium play is difficult to explain 
with purely introspective theory. 
 
While some studies have been looking at the theoretical side of the question by analyzing the 
convergence supported by evolutionary forces or adaptive rules, other studies have been using 
experimental data to examine in a more accurate way the player’s behaviour. Experiments are 
a good way to test models of learning because we can control how payoffs and information 
affect interactions in games. It’s a good way to observe and analyze what subjects know (and 
know others know, and so on), what they expect to earn from different strategies, what they 
have experienced in the past, and so forth.  
The present study is clearly based on the latter idea. 
 
There are many approaches to learning in games:  
- Evolutionary dynamics. It assumes that a player is born with a strategy and plays the 
same strategy all over again, no matter how much repetition. The more successful the 
strategy, the longer the player survives or the more he reproduces. 
- Reinforcement learning. One step further to evolutionary models in the cognitive 
sophistication is the idea that agents might reinforce their previously played strategy 
looking at their last payoff. 
- Belief learning models assume that players update their beliefs about the other’s 
strategy by examining their opponent’s past behaviour and identifying the best one. 
Fictitious play model is one of these belief based learning models. In fictitious play, 
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players keep track of what has been played in the past and use these records to 
determine their future strategy in the upcoming periods.  
At the opposite, there is Cournot best-respond dynamics: he assumes that players only 
look at the most recently played strategy of the opponent, think that it will be played 
again and determine their best-response based on this last observation. 
Weighted fictitious play model (Cheung and Friedman, 1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998) assumes a hybrid form of the Fictitious play and Cournot models. Players might 
actually mix these two strategies, maybe looking only at a given number of last 
observed opponent’s choices, applying different probabilities of future realization on 
them. The belief held by player i about the probability that player j will play action a 
in round t+1 is given by: 
˜ B i
a
(t +1) =
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a j t( )=a( )
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where Id
a j t( )=a( )
 equals one if player j has played action a in round t, and zero 
otherwise. Actions played in a given round are discounted with time at rate "  " 0,1[ ].  
As stated above, when " = 0, this model reduces to Cournot Learning, where the belief 
held in period t about action a is one if the action has been played in round t-1, and 
zero otherwise, while when " =1, the model reduces to fictitious play, where the belief 
about a given action corresponds to the frequency with which this action has been 
played since round 1. The Cheung Friedman model has been found to perform well 
empirically to explain people’s behaviour in games. 
- Experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning is Ho’s and Camerer’s (1999a) model 
combining elements of reinforcement theories and weighted fictitious play. The model 
adds an element to reinforcement and belief learning, the weight players give to 
forgone payoffs from non-chosen strategies. If this weight is very low, it means that 
the player’s strategy reduces to a simple version of choice reinforcement, whereas 
when the weight is very high, the player’s model of decision reduces to a weighted 
fictitious play. 
- Imitation. People learn by imitating the others behaviours. It is not necessarily payoff 
dependent (imitation of the successful opponent/player). 
- Sophisticated (anticipatory) learning. In adaptive models such as fictitious play or 
EWA, players only look back at the previous history of the game interaction. This 
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means that players will never act differently from before or from what they expect. 
Their beliefs are based on what they have previously observed. “They will also ignore 
information about other player’s payoffs” (Camerer, 1995). But a lot of studies show 
that players do care about other player’s payoffs. Anticipatory learning models or 
sophistication overcome these limitations (Selten, 1986; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 
2002a; Stahl, 1999a). Camerer et al. (2002) assume a population composed of fully 
rational players (having the ability to play equilibrium behaviour) and adaptive ones 
who only look backward to choose their current action, and adds sophistication to 
adaptive models. Of course, rational players have in mind their own estimation of the 
repartition (not necessarily the real one) between rational and adaptive players, using 
their knowledge to outguess their adaptive opponents. They observed that “players do 
use information about other’s players’ payoffs to reason more thoughtfully about what 
other players’ payoffs will do in the future.” Players might form beliefs and best 
respond according to them but the true originality is that players don’t just think that 
their opponents will basically reproduce the same patterns of behaviour (as if they 
were myopic). 
- Rule learning. This model assumes that players use decision rules that transform 
histories into strategy choices. They determine through the game process which rules 
rather than which specific strategy to use. These rules can be all of those listed above 
and others like tit-for-tat (answering the same or opposite way the opponent(s) did in 
the previous period), level-k reasoning, the idea of this latter theory is that people do 
possess different level of reasoning abilities and that the more reasoning levels you 
get, the more you are able to predict the level of reasoning of your opponents (Stahl 
and Wilson, 1995) and choose your strategy accordingly. 
 
Most of the reviewed literature (except for the sophistication model) about theories of 
learning considers the player as myopic and purely adaptive, taking their decisions based 
almost entirely on their past experience and based on the assumption that their opponent 
follows an exogenous process, as if he was a kind of machine, pre-programmed to react in a 
given way to a given strategy. As a consequence, such myopic players might never take into 
account the effect or influence of their own actions on their opponents’ future behaviour. This 
statement might lead to think that strategic interaction in games do not matter for players, 
which seems quiet a strong assumption. The other way of thinking, that players might only 
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behave within the frame of full rationality (Nash equilibrium player), is another kind of 
extreme. There might be an explanation between these two extremes. 
 
What if for example we observe a rational player surrounded with other players who learn 
only from personal experience, like in Ellison’s (1997) paper? He shows that the learning 
process naturally generates contagion dynamics, and that the rational player has an incentive 
to act non-myopically and with patience to move the whole group to a new a risk-dominant 
equilibrium (see above).  
On the contrary, Offerman et al. (2001) found that player’s belief formation doesn’t take into 
account strategic interactions. However, the authors highlited that the public good game they 
used in their experiment is strategically complicated, namely that a funding threshold has to 
be reached before the good can be provided. The game has also multiple equilibria so that the 
players are cognitively highly stimulated and it makes the strategic reasoning very difficult. 
Huck et al. (1999) found that players tend to imitate the others and that “imitation might be 
the unique learning rule that prevents human players from teaching their opponents”. But in 
other experimental environments, players have proven to be more sophisticated (far-sighted) 
and use their actions not only to optimize their immediate pay-off as myopic players would do 
but also to manipulate (or teach) their opponents’ behaviour in order to reach preferable 
outcome in the future. 
 
Hyndman, Terracol and Vaksmann (2009), while studying teaching in coordination, show that 
teaching represents an investment according to which players might postpone immediate 
payoffs by playing sub-optimal actions in order to manipulate their opponents and get more in 
the long-run by leading the other players to a preferable equilibrium, and this especially when 
teaching incentives are high and teaching costs are low. Terracol and Vaksmann (2009) also 
identified the role of teaching on convergence to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in fixed 
matching environments.   
 
The present study would like to show – among other things - in the spirit of Hyndman, 
Terracol and Vaksmann (2009), that learning and teaching are still observed in an 
environment where there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium (but still, as in any finite game, 
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium), which is the case in the majority of real-life situations. 
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The main objective in this paper is to test experimentally the following hypotheses: 
- First, we want to know if players believe that their opponents can be learners and that 
their actions might influence their opponent’s beliefs. 
- Second, we would like to investigate the idea that players do use this awareness of 
their opponent’s ability to learn to manipulate their opponents’ beliefs.  
- Third, we want to know if there are other explanations we can provide for the way 
players behave in our game: “cyclic behaviour”, “learning of correlated strategies”? 
- Last, we think that Inequity and Risk aversion might play a role but that doesn’t 
undermine our teaching strategy hypothesis mentioned above. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our game and experimental 
procedure. Section III gives some preliminary results and descriptive statistics. Section IV-V 
and VI shows that subjects might be more sophisticated than the standard theories predict. 
Section VII-VIII-IX explore the possibility of “cyclic playing behaviours”, the existence of a 
learning of “correlated strategy” and examines the effect of “inequity and risk aversion”. 
Section X concludes the paper. 
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II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
1. Game and Incentives 
 
In order to examine the emergence of teaching, an experimental session was conducted using 
a 2 x 2 matrix game. 26 inexperienced subjects (12 female subjects) aged between 22 and 65 
years were drawn randomly at the library of the University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne 
(Maison des Sciences Economiques) and from outside the University and were asked to play 
the game presented in Figure 1 for a total of 20 periods (the game stayed the same along all 
periods). Let’s take an example to explain the following matrix. On period one, if Player 1 
selects strategy A and Player 2 selects strategy C, the outcome for Player 1 is 80 and the 
outcome for Player 2 is 20. If Player 1 selects strategy B and Player 2 selects strategy C, the 
outcome for Player 1 is 100 and the outcome for Player 2 is 25, and so on. Every combination 
has respectively 2 outcomes for both players. 
In order to give the best chance for teaching to emerge, subjects were put in fixed pairs for the 
entire experiment and this information was clearly stated in the instructions (see Appendix). 
We voluntarily took a non-symmetrical pay-off matrix and lower payoffs for Player 1 and 2 in 
order to avoid interaction effects between the players when observing learning and teaching. 
All this will be explained further in this paper. 
 
Player 2  
Strategy C Strategy D 
Strategy A 80, 20 60, 15 
Player 1 
Strategy B 100, 25 40, 30 
Figure 1. Payoff matrix 
 
Before each experimental session began, subjects were randomly assigned the role of either 
Player 1 (row player) or Player 2 (column player) and were told that they would remain in 
that role for the entire duration of the experiment. We had to do every experimental session 
one at a time for material reasons. Subjects were put in front of each other with only one 
computer. The game was presented on a Microsoft Excel file (Figure 2 and Appendix).  No 
talking was allowed during the entire duration of the experiment. 
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Player 1 had to fill-in his answers for the first period, click on a button, which would present a 
neutral page and turn the computer so that the other player could use his own playing 
interface, and so forth. This procedure could guarantee that the players were playing the game 
simultaneously, ignoring what the other player was playing in the on-going period. After the 
first period was over, both players would see the outcomes of the previous period. Anytime, 
both players could also see their own choices and previous opponent’s choices along the 
entire history of the game. Subjects were told the experiment would last not more than 30 
minutes.  
 
 
Figure 2. Excel file of the experiment 
 
On average, the experiment’s duration was around 45 minutes, 2 pairs of subjects took more 
than 1 hour to understand the experiment and go through the game. 
 
There was no fixed participation fee. Subjects were told that they were 2 player types: Player 
1 and Player 2. They were also told that there was no competition between the two actually 
playing subjects. They were notified that the minimum possible payoff of Player 1 was 
greater than the maximum possible payoff of Player 2.  They were also told that if they best 
! )"!
performed among the players of their type (Player 1 or Player 2 type), they would be 
rewarded 5!. They didn’t know the subjects who belonged to their type.  Subjects earned on 
average 72 ECU (SD= 22,21) (Experimental Currency Unit) inside the Player 1 type and 22 
ECU inside the Player 2 type. 
A translation from the original French instructions given to the subjects can be found in the 
Appendix. In addition, subjects received an oral summary of the experimental conditions 
detailed in the instructions and questions were answered before the experiment began. 
 
Notice that our game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and one mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was {(0.5,0.5);(0.5,0.5)}. (see definition of 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium above). 
 
Note that one desirable feature of our design is that, since there is no pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium and since players aren’t in competition, subjects have to choose the best-response 
strategy given their beliefs about the strategy of others. Player 1 types have a bigger incentive 
for playing their maximum payoff strategy than Player 2 types (strategy B, payoff 100, if 
strategy C is selected by Player 2). But they face the risk that Player 2 type might shift to 
strategy D to maximize his own payoff (strategy D, payoff 30, if strategy B is selected by 
Player 1). Given the nature of the payoff matrix. 
Under the hypothesis of risk neutrality, Player 2 could want to minimize his risk of getting the 
minimum payoff (15 if Player 1 plays A) and try to get either 20 or 25 most of the time. On 
the other side, Player 1 anticipating (sophisticatedly) the previous Player 2 strategy might 
want to try to teach his way to his maximum payoff (100 if Player 2 plays C). Player 1 should 
play strategy A at the beginning of the game in order to force Player 2 to play his “safe” 
strategy C. Once this is done, after a few periods, he should shift to strategy B and earn his 
maximum payoff, creating a stable strategy combination (B-C). This is the kind of behaviour 
that we define as teaching. More precisely teaching is best thought of as an investment: the 
successful teacher will incur short-run costs (80 for an A-C combination) in order to obtain a 
long-run gain (100 for an B-C combination). 
Note, however, that in order to study teaching, we also need teachers (Player 1) to be paired 
with subjects who are capable of being taught (e.g., an adaptive learner, Player 2). In order to 
do this in our game, we kept the shifting incentives of Player 2 very low (5), moreover, the 
incentives that the Player 2 had to engage in long-run behaviour were always lower than those 
of the Player 1 (5 for Player 2, 20 for Player 1). 
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If both players converge toward the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, we should observe a 
25% repartition in all four cells of the payoff matrix (25% for A-C, B-C, A-D, B-D). 
At the end of each session, the experimenter asked separately to all participants what was 
their strategy. We will describe some of them later in the paper. 
 
2.  Belief Elicitation  
 
The aim of the present study is to examine the player’s propensity to play sub-optimal 
strategies during a possible teaching phase. For this examination to be possible, we need to 
observe the difference – if there is a difference – between what subjects believe and what they 
really play given these beliefs, and what outcome do they get. Following the work of Nyarko 
and Schotter (2002), Hyndman, Terracol and Vaksmann (2009), we had to elicit player’s 
beliefs to precisely determine their best response at each time. In each round, subjects had to 
perform two kinds of actions: 
- First, they were asked to report what they thought their opponent would do during the 
current period with a probability question. “On a scale from 0 to 100, what is the 
likelihood that your opponent will play strategy A and B (C or D) if Player 1 was 
asked the question)?  
- Second, after answering the above question, they had to choose their action A or B (C 
or D), depending on their Player type. 
Beliefs were rewarded for accuracy according to the following quadratic scoring rule, which 
should induce truth-telling if subjects are risk neutral: 
8 " 4 1" b
a( )
2
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2
z#a
$( )% & ' 
( 
) *  
If their belief were close to what their opponent did during the on-going period, they could 
earn a maximum of 8 points. If subjects’ prediction were completely wrong, they would get 0 
points for their prediction. Let’s take an example. If Player 1 predicts that Player 2 will play 
strategy C with 100% chances, and Player 2 actually plays strategy C, than the pay-off derive 
from the above function is P =  8 – 4 (1-100%)2+(0%)2 = 8.
 
We tried to keep the reward reporting beliefs small in comparison with the payoffs associated 
to the game so that players could not use their belief payoff as a “hedge” against potentially 
low payoffs. At the end of each round, subjects were informed about the action of their 
opponent, their game payoff, their prediction payoff and the game payoff of their opponent 
for the current round. Again, during the whole experiment, subjects could see the entire 
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history of actions and stage game payoffs as well as their predictions in earlier rounds, but not 
their prediction payoffs from earlier rounds. 
 
III. GAME OUTCOME COMBINATIONS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
We will begin our analysis of the experimental results with a brief look at the combination 
outcomes combination of the game. 
 
Comparison Prop. t-test significance Combination Mean Proportion (Std. Dev.) 
AC < BC 0,27 AC 28,08% (0,449) 
AC > AD 2,29** BC 28,85% (0,453) 
AC > BD 2,59*** AD 21,92% (0,414) 
BC > AD 2,56*** BD 21,15% (0,409) 
BC > BD 2,86*** 
AD > BD 0,30 () 
 
*10% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; *** 1% level of significance. 
Table 1. Comparison of proportions of combinations during the whole game (period 1-20) 
 
For the proportion comparison results, we used a two-sample t-test of proportion. All the 
results in this table are confirmed by non-parametrical Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
Comparison 
Prop. t-test 
significance 
period 1-10 
Prop. t-test 
significance 
period 11-20 
Comb. 
Mean 
Proportion 
period 1-10  
(St. Dev.) 
Mean 
Proportion 
Period 11-20 
(St. Dev.) 
AC vs BC 0,20 -0,58 AC 27,69% (0,448) 28,46% (0,452) 
AC > AD 0,40 2,91*** BC 26,92% (0,444) 30,77 % (0,462) 
AC > BD 2,28** 1,40 AD 26,15% (0,440) 17,69% (0,382) 
BC > AD 0,20 3,48*** BD 19,23% (0,395) 23,07% (0,422) 
BC > BD 2,08** 1,98** 
AD vs BD 1,88** -1,52* 
 
*10% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; *** 1% level of significance. 
Table 2. Comparison of proportions of combinations during the first and last 10 periods of the game. 
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Let’s look at each possible outcome combination (see Figure 1), try to give a hypothetical 
meaning to every four of them and see if we find some evidence in our descriptive statistics 
above: 
- BD combination: BD gives the maximum outcome (30) to Player 2 but is Player 1’s 
minimum outcome (40). There is a risk for Player 2 to play this strategy because 
Player 1 will systematically try to move to AD in order to increase his payoff (to 60). 
As a result Player 2’s risk is to get his minimum outcome (15) after BD was played. It 
might be interesting to point out the fact that BD is also an inequity aversion 
combination. Even if subjects knew they were not in competition with each other, a 
few of them reported to be surprised by the fact that the other player would always –
whatever the situation – earn more then them. In our data (see Table 1), BD shows up 
21,15% of the time and has significantly the lowest proportion of combination 
compared to the other combinations (except for AD).  
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of played combination for AD and BD. 
 
- AD combination: AD is the worst combination for Player 2 and as such, he might not 
want to stay very long in this situation. Player 2 could try to shift to C in order to 
increase his payoff by 5 ECU or try to teach his way to BD again, this being very 
unlikely since playing D makes the Player 2 dependent of Player 1’s decision. AD is 
the third most played combination in the game and is significantly inferior to AC and 
BC in terms of proportion. When looking more closely at the data (see Figure 3), we 
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see that AD is a transition combination. Each time we observe an increase in BD, 
almost in the next period, we observe an increase in the AD combinations. 
- AC combination: AC is risk aversion combination for both players. If Player 1 plays 
AC and try to teach his way to BC, he faces the risk of Player 2 trying to teach his way 
to BD and so on, returning back to the original position AC after four periods. Player 2 
is better of playing column C because he secures a mean outcome if Player 1 plays 
randomly A or B. During the debriefing phase, subjects do report that they played AC 
combination because they felt it was the better way to secure this mean outcome. In 
our data, we can see that AC and BC are the most played combination, statistically 
significant at more than 1%, especially in middle of the first and last 10 periods of the 
game (see Table 2 and Figure 4). We can observe this pike at period 4-5-6 and the 
same pattern at period 14-15-16. In the figure 4, just visually, we might find the first 
raw evidence that at this point Player 1 may have tried to teach their way to the BC 
combination by over-playing AC. This pattern is confirmed by the fact that AC and 
BC show almost the same proportion during the whole game. In the first 10 periods, 
combination AC is more played than combination BC and this tendency is reversed in 
the last ten periods. Statistically speaking, these differences are not significant but we 
need to remind our reader that the number of subjects is 13, this effect might be 
confirmed significant with more observations and a more refined experimental design. 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of played combination for AC and BC. 
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- BC combination: BC is the best combination for Player 1. His motivation (teaching 
incentive?) to reach this outcome is higher than Player 2’s motivation to reach his (100 
vs. 30). Our idea was that the BC combination would be the next step (the more 
played combination) after AC. After playing A for a while, Player 1 should normally 
try to get to his maximum outcome shifting to from AC to BC, overcoming the risk 
(teaching cost?) of Player 2 trying to shift upon BD. This might be the teaching 
investment we have been evoking earlier in this paper. If we look closely at the figure 
4 (above), we might find that the pikes of BC combination follow very closely the 
pikes of AC combination (especially period 8-9 after the big pike of AC combination, 
and also period 13-14 and period 16-17-18). Again, in order to observe a statistically 
significant difference, we might increase the number of subjects and also the number 
of periods. We will discuss these limits of the experimental design at the end of this 
paper. 
 
Teaching cost and teaching incentives are both notions reported by Hyndman, Terracol & 
Vaksmann (2009). They have been manipulating these variables showing that the more 
the incentive and the less the cost of teaching, the more teaching they observe. We are 
going to seek for a confirmation of these results in the next sections. 
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IV. “DO I THINK MY OPPONENT CAN BE A LEARNER?” 
 
Before even mentioning teaching strategies, we need to be sure about the fact that subjects are 
aware that their opponent might learn from their previously played strategies. Indeed, if the 
teacher believes his opponent updates his actions largely due to the observed history of play, 
and that he updates sufficiently rapidly, then he might be willing to make the required short-
term investment in order to make his way through his best combination. In this section, we 
examine whether players beliefs are influenced by their own actions or see their opponents as 
learners. Our idea is to see if subjects believe they can influence their opponents through their 
own choices. This implies in the spirit of Terracol and Vaksmann (2009) “an investigation of 
players’ belief formation process to check whether they take into account the influence 
brought by their own past actions when forming beliefs about their opponents’ behaviour at a 
given time”.  
 
 
This means we want to see if subjects view their opponent as an adaptive learner who is 
capable of being taught something. 
We are not interested in modelling the way player’s action might influence his opponent’s 
behaviour, we just need to show that there might be a belief that teaching is possible. 
If we ask ourselves how players build their beliefs, along the work of Hyndman, Terracol & 
Vaksmann (2009), two elements might come to our mind: 
- First, we need to check if players do look at the past history of action of their opponents 
to form their beliefs, and if this has an effect on their prediction (the answer to the belief 
elicitation question). This first element will be integrated in our regression model as a 
“history of action” variable, expressed as the observed frequency of choices made by the 
opponent, under the hypothesis that player’s behaviours follow the fictitious play model. 
- Second, if players think they can influence (teach) their opponents’ action, they might 
also take into account the effect of their own last actions when they answer to our belief 
elicitation question. This second element will be integrated in our regression model as a 
“last action” variable (in t-1). 
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Our two elements is expressed through these following formulas: 
 
Bit = F historyofaction1" t#1,lastactiont#1( )
ˆ B it =G historyofaction1" t#1( )
Dit = Bit #
ˆ B it
 
 
B
it
 represents the effect of the combination of history of action and last action variables 
regressed on the prediction of the opponents choice. ˆ B 
it
 represents the effect of the history of 
action variable alone regressed on the prediction of the opponents choice. 
D
it
is the difference between the two first presented elements, basically the part of the 
prediction unexplained by the “history of choice” variable. If the last action variable 
demonstrates a significant effect in our model, we might conclude that the player may 
take into account his own action in the prediction of his opponent action and in a next 
step, might also try to influence his opponent’s beliefs. 
 
To operationalize this model with our data, we run two OLS regressions along the following 
formulas: 
Player 1’s prediction over Player 2’s current choice C estimation: Equation (1) 
BC t = "0 + "1actA t#1 + "2 freqC0$ t#1 +% it  
 
B
C
t
is our dependant variable, the prediction by Player 1 that Player 2 will play C during the 
current period. "
1
act
A
t#1
represents Player 1’s last action A and "
2
freqC
0# t$1 Player 2’s 
observed history of action C observed by Player 1 (independent variables). 
  
Player 2’s prediction over Player 1’s current choice B estimation: Equation (2) 
BB t = "0 + "1actC t#1 + "2 freqB0$ t#1 +% it  
 
B
B
t
is our dependant variable, the prediction by Player 2 that Player 1 will play B during the 
current period. "
1
act
C
t#1
represents Player 2’s last action C and "
2
freqB
0# t$1 Player 1’s 
observed history of action B observed by Player 2 (independent variables). 
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Our estimation results of Equation 1 and 2 are collected in Table 3. 
 
B
C
t
 Coef. (SE) BB
t
 Coef. (SE) 
act
A
t"1
 -8,17* (4.377) actC
t"1
 6,32 (4,839) 
freqC
1" t#1
 0,45*** (0,096) freqB
1" t#1
 0,576*** (0,081) 
cons. 37,77*** (6,238) cons. 20,28*** (5,382) 
10% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; *** 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The number of individuals is given in Table 1, each individual played 20 periods. 
Table 3. Regression model. 
 
The above results show that their is a significant correlation between prediction of Player 1’s 
(he) prediction about Player 2’s (she) choice and his last action. Our analysis shows some 
consistency with our hypothesis that Player 1 (prediction BCt) perceives their own past actions 
(actAt-1) as significantly likely to influence their opponent’s current and future actions. This is 
not the case for Player 2’s behaviour. The last action of Player 2 plays no significant rule in 
the prediction BBt (prediction that Player 1 will play strategy B during the current period).  
 
However, we need to emphasize the fact that we found a puzzling result about the sign of the 
last action (actAt-1) variable, which correlation is negative. This means that the more Player 1 
plays strategy A, the lower his prediction of Player 2 playing strategy C. We can try to 
explain this negative sign (which is definitely positive for Player 2’s equivalent prediction 
about Player 1 playing B) by the fact that Player 1 might not be so confident with the fact that 
his last action will influence his opponent in the long run and he might integrate this idea in 
his prediction. 
 
Another alternative explanation might rely on the experimental conditions that were used, 
clearly not as strict as what is expected in the standards of experimental literature. After 
debriefing, subjects were not always very confident at the beginning of the game with the 
“prediction” question they were asked for. We are conscious of the serious problem this result 
might be for our work and we will have to investigate this effect deeper in further research. 
 
We may conclude (with caution) that players think their opponents modify their behaviour 
according to the history of the game, and take this into account in their own beliefs; in other 
! ++!
words, subjects realize that their opponents can learn, which is necessary for teaching to even 
be possible. This shows that players might take strategic interactions into account and form 
beliefs in a more sophisticated way than the adaptive way postulated by usual proxies. We 
might have highlighted a sophistication bias1 (Hyndman, Terracol, Vaksman, 2009) in 
classical proxies used to describe player’s belief-formation process. 
Note that we do not assume that players necessarily base their beliefs on the history of their 
opponents’ play, but rather allow for the possibility of such a belief-formation process. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)!the fact that subjects believe that their past actions influence their opponent’s current decisions 
!
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V. DO PLAYERS USE THE AWARENESS THAT THEIR OPPONENT’S MIGHT BE 
LEARNERS TO TEACH THEM? 
 
The previous section highlighted that in our game there is a scope for teaching. The next 
question we are asking is whether player, particularly Player 1 given their stronger incentives, 
use their awareness of the belief-formation process to manipulate their opponent’s belief and 
influence or teach their way to their best outcome. 
In the belief-learning literature, players are thought to take a stochastic best response to their 
beliefs. If we take this idea into consideration, choices which are not a best response to beliefs 
may be called errors. However, if subjects are trying to teach, then they are taking a 
statistically sub-optimal action (predicting that their opponent will play C and still playing A 
while they could have played B to maximize their payoff), expecting that their maximum 
payoff combination will emerge at some point in time. 
In order to capture this sub-optimal action, we need to identify the player’s choices according 
to whether or not they were playing a best response to stated beliefs. We say that a player 
“over responds to C” whenever he chooses A despite the fact that B is a best response to his 
stated belief C. If our subjects are the teachers we expect them to be, they would over respond 
to A much more frequently than they over respond to B. 
 
Since we are not able to say that Player 2 might act as a teacher (see previous section), we are 
going to focus on the results of Player 1 type.  
Indeed, this is precisely what we see concerning Player 1. If we compare the over-response 
rate between A and B, we find that Player 1 over-respond A 19,23% of the time and B 8,46% 
of the time and that this difference is highly significant (two sample test of proportion, p-
value < 1%). Over-response rate A is also superior to over-response rate C (significant, p-
value < 10%).  
It is hard to interpret such strong tendencies to choose A when B is a best response as errors 
since it would mean that our subjects are making quite costly errors with considerable 
frequency. The comparative statics are consistent with our earlier hypothesis of teaching 
behaviour for Player 1. 
 
! +#!
 
Figure 5. Comparison of proportion of over-responses A and B. 
 
Besides, if we look at the Figure 5, we can see that this tendency to over-respond A is 
diminishing over time, meaning that the Player 1 might have tried to teach his opponent 
during the first 10 periods and seeing that his teaching strategy had no effect, he might have 
abandoned it in the last 10 periods. If we compare the over-response rate between A in the 
first 10 periods (24,61%) and in the last 10 periods (13,84%), we find a significant difference 
(p-value < 5%), between these two time spans. 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of proportion of over-responses A and C. 
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If we look at Figure 6, we might find some interesting significant results. Player 1 starts 
teaching in the first 10 periods and Player 2 waits the last 10 periods to over-respond C (not 
significant, but again graphically interesting). This result might need further research with 
more subjects and more experimental design compliance to the standards of the literature. 
 
Our results - the dynamics of over-response - so far provide support for our third hypothesis 
that subjects try to teach their opponents even if this tendency decreases over time and 
particularly when the opponent do not react to it. Our results also suggest that Player 2 types 
take a more passive role and are more likely to be followers. 
 
 
 
 
! +%!
VI. IS THIS TEACHING STRATEGY A WINING STRATEGY? 
 
Our first answer to this question is that the players who earned the more ECUs were those 
who managed to teach their opponent: Player 1 teaching Player 2 to play AC before shifting 
to the BC outcome. 
If we look at the means of earning, we can say that Player 1 types – who have been shown to 
try to teach their way to their maximum combination in the previous section - earn 
significantly more than the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (one-sample t-test, 72 ECUs 
(Teach) > 70 ECUs (Nash) with a p-value < 5%). This difference is not significant for the 
Player 2 types earning. 
 
VII.  DO PLAYERS SETTLE DOWN ON A “CYCLIC STRATEGY”? 
 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of proportion of choice A and choice C. 
 
This idea of “cyclic strategy” comes from the fact that players might play a given series of 
combination during the game that they might informally agree on during the experiment. 
 
If we take a closer look at Figure 7, we can see that Player 2 strongly reacts to Player 1’s 
choice A with choice C. A pike in choice A correspond most of the time to a pike in choice C. 
Statistically speaking, where in the first period, there is no significant difference between 
choice A and choice C, this difference becomes significant (choice C: 59,44% > choice A: 
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47,54%, with a p-value < 10%). This results show some consistency with the idea that Player 
2 might react to the teaching strategy of Player 1 choosing strategy A maybe in order to move 
to choice B afterwards, which is confirmed by the shift of choice A in Figure 7 from 53% in 
the first 10 periods (mean proportion) to 47% in the last 10 periods (mean proportion). These 
last observation are purely speculative, no statistical significance emerged in the data. 
 
An interesting observation of the raw data shows that a few pairs of players show a pattern of 
combination suites where both Player settle down on a playing cycle, an alternation between 
BC and BD, playing BC most of the time, but sometimes playing BD.  These pairs are also 
those with the most important earnings. This is what we might call a cyclic behaviour, both 
players accepting to deviate from their best-outcome for a few periods in order to content 
each other, without the threat of loosing to much through the process. 
 
VIII. CAN WE TALK ABOUT LEARNING OF CORRELATED STRATEGY IN OUR GAME?  
 
The idea of a correlated learning strategy relies on the fact that players might try to approach 
a dynamic equilibrium during the learning process of the game. This is an hypothesis that we 
would like to test with our following results. 
In fact, Player 1’s mean choice behaviour is to play strategy A and B 50% of the time, this is a 
significant equality when considered all Player 1’s mean choices. However, Player 2’s mean 
choice behaviour is to play strategy C 57% of the time and strategy D 43% of the time, this 
difference being significant at less than 1% level. 
It is important to notice that nothing prevents us from saying that players don’t play the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium, but we may find some consistency with the idea that while Player 
1 alternates evenly between both strategies, Player 2 playing C more frequently than D, and 
tries to maximize his minimum outcome (20 and 25), this strategy being the less risky and 
costly for him. This idea goes against the teaching hypothesis tested above and goes along the 
theories of Rule learning (Stahl and Wilson, 1995). 
 
We should add that in order for correlated strategies or cyclic behaviour to emerge, players 
might have to engage into a teaching process. 
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IX. WHAT ABOUT INEQUITY AND RISK AVERSION? 
 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) define inequity aversion as the preference for fairness (equity) and 
resistance to incident inequalities. They showed that disadvantageous Inequity Aversion 
manifests itself in humans as the “willingness to sacrifice potential gain to block another 
individual from receiving a superior reward”. They argue that this, apparently self-destructive 
response, is essential in creating an environment in which bilateral bargaining can thrive. 
 
Along this concept, even though none of the subjects in our game are in direct competition 
(see Instructions in the Appendix part), playing combination AC for both Players is an 
inequity aversion strategy. Why? Because none of the players gets his maximum payoff and 
both of them get an acceptable payoff, given their respective incentives. This might explain 
why there is so much proportion of combination AC in our results (see Table 1). 
But this Inequity aversion behaviour is not contradicting our teaching strategy hypothesis. In 
fact, with these results, we might say that Player 1 after trying for a few times to teach Player 
2 through BC gets back to AC because Player 2 goes to BD as soon as he can, Player 1 shifts 
to AD afterwards and they stabilize on AC, because after a few teaching trials, moving is a 
costly effort for both of them. 
 
Risk aversion is the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather 
than another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff.  In our game, 
the uncertainty is more about the choice of a player given the choice of the other.  
We believe that when choosing strategy B, Player 1 might consider the risk of Player 2 
playing D. If this is the case, than it would explain the contradiction we found in our 
regression model above (see the negative correlation in Table 3, Section IV), and the sizeable 
proportion of AC compared to BC strategies in our data (see Section II). 
 
!
! +(!
X. DISCUSSION 
 
In the past decade, several learning models have been developed to describe how people play 
games and through this modelling, researchers have tried to better understand the way people 
interact in given socio-economic situations. One of the common grounds these models have 
found is that individuals regard their counterparts’ behaviour as generated by an “exogenous 
process” and do not realize that they could influence it via their actions. These idea need to be 
nuanced. Indeed, recent studies have shown the limits of this assumption in various situations. 
Subjects might be more sophisticated and attempt to teach their opponents to play a particular 
action, even if, as we saw it with our game there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In a 
way, our game setup is much closer to real-life situations where there is rarely evidence of an 
obvious pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, or at least, people don’t take into account. 
This paper has tried to stress out the determinants of such a strategic behaviour and to show 
that subjects are indeed responsive to the motivation that they are given to mobilize a far-
sighted behaviour. This is what we called a sophisticated behaviour. Our results have shown 
some evidence of such sophistication. 
First, we demonstrated that players were conscious that their opponents might be a learner, a 
condition necessary to any kind of teaching strategy. Second, we found that players were 
trying to take advantage of this knowledge in order to teach their way to their own preferable 
outcome, especially players who were more incentivised to do so. Third we showed that this 
teaching behaviour was not always very efficient but that it did improve the earnings of the 
players compared to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We also investigated cyclic 
behaviour and learning of correlated strategies, showing that these might be interesting 
consequences of the teaching behaviour. Last, we saw that there might be an effect of 
Inequity and Risk aversion but these findings doesn’t undermine the teaching effect that we 
observed. 
Our idea is that our results might improve the public policy insights about the ways to 
influence people by manipulating their beliefs for law reinforcement or dissuasive purposes.  
 
Limitations 
 
First concerning our experiment, we are fully aware that our experimental design is not 
perfect and that the conditions of our experiment are not optimal – due to budgets constraints 
- especially compared to the standards of the experimental economics literature, but we 
! "*!
believe that if we find even a small effect on our data in these experimental conditions, we 
might find even bigger effects in a more controlled and standard environment. 
Concerning the belief elicitation manipulation, even if several studies (e. g. Offerman and 
Sonnemans, 2001; Nyarko and Schotter, 2002) indicate that subjets report their true beliefs 
when incentivized by the Quadratic Scoring Rule, Rutström and Wilcox (2004), however, 
finds that an intrusive scoring rule for belief elicitation affects people’s behaviour. It might 
also focus the player on something that we want to observe naturally, namely that subjects are 
asked about their beliefs of what the other will do, basically forcing them to get out of their 
maybe natural adaptive behaviour. 
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